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Abstract
The authors model trading by foreign and domestic investors in developed-country equity
markets. The key assumptions are that (i) both the foreign and domestic investor populations
contain investors of different sophistication, and (ii) investor sophistication matters for
performance in both public equity and private off-market investments. A quantitative model with
these assumptions delivers a uniﬁed explanation for three stylized facts about U.S. investors’
international equity trades that have been documented in the literature: (i) trading by U.S.
investors occurs in bursts of simultaneous buying and selling, (ii) Americans build and unwind
foreign equity positions gradually, and (iii) U.S. investors increase their market share in a country
when stock prices in that country have recently been rising.
JEL classiﬁcation: F30, G12, G14, G15
Bank classiﬁcation: Financial markets; International topics; Market structure and pricing
Résumé
Les auteurs modélisent l’activité boursière des investisseurs étrangers et nationaux dans les pays
développés. Leur étude repose sur deux grandes hypothèses : i) le niveau de connaissance des
marchés ﬁnanciers varie parmi les investisseurs, tant étrangers que nationaux; ii) la familiarité des
investisseurs avec le fonctionnement des marchés inﬂue aussi bien sur le rendement des
placements à la bourse que sur celui des placements privés hors marché. Le modèle quantitatif
proposé permet d’expliquer de façon cohérente trois faits stylisés, mis en évidence dans la
littérature, concernant l’activité boursière internationale des investisseurs américains.
Premièrement, les transactions de ce groupe d’investisseurs prennent la forme de vagues
simultanées d’achats et de ventes. Deuxièmement, ces investisseurs accroissent graduellement
leurs participations à l’étranger et s’en défont tout aussi progressivement. Troisièmement, ils se
portent acquéreurs de volumes accrus d’actions dans un pays donné quand les prix des valeurs
mobilières y augmentent depuis peu.
Classiﬁcation JEL : F30, G12, G14, G15
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Marchés ﬁnanciers; Questions internationales; Structure de marché
et ﬁxation des prix1. Introduction
Do diﬀerences in investor sophistication drive international equity ﬂows?
Existing literature has emphasized cross-country diﬀerences in information
about public equity.1 It is typically assumed that foreign investors have less
information about domestic stocks than domestic investors. This view ab-
stracts from two features of actual portfolio choice. First, country investor
populations are heterogeneous. In modern, developed-country stock markets,
where the best (and worst) foreign and local traders are likely to have very
similar backgrounds and skills, within-country heterogeneity may be more
important than cross-country heterogeneity. Second, many participants in
public equity markets also invest in other risky assets. Diﬀerences in sophis-
tication should be relevant not only for stock market performance, but also
for proﬁts made from private investment opportunities.
In this paper, we consider a model that accommodates both features and
calibrate it to data on dividends, returns, and U.S. investors’ trades in the
G-7 countries. We show that this provides a uniﬁed explanation for a num-
ber of regularities that have been noted in the empirical literature, but that
have not been captured in a structural model. In particular, data on U.S.
investors’ trades exhibit the following stylized facts:
(i) Bursts of gross trading activity. Gross aggregate purchases and sales by
U.S. investors in a given country are positively contemporaneously corre-
lated: trading by U.S. investors thus occurs in bursts of simultaneous buying
and selling.
(ii) Flow momentum (Persistence). Americans build and unwind foreign po-
sitions gradually: a net inﬂow into a country observed today predicts a net
inﬂow over at least the next 2 quarters.
(iii) Return chasing. Both current and lagged local stock returns are pos-
itively correlated with current net purchases by U.S. investors, normalized
by market capitalization. The average U.S. investor thus “chases returns”:
when prices have been increasing, the average U.S. investor buys shares from
the average local investor.
In our model, the stock market of a G-7 economy has domestic and U.S.-
based participants. Unsophisticated investors, both domestic and American,
trade stocks with (foreign or American) sophisticated investors. The latter
are not only better informed about local stocks, but also have access to
1See section 2 for a review of the literature.
1private “oﬀ-market” opportunities. Both dividends on stocks and payoﬀs
on private opportunities depend on the local business cycle, but are not
perfectly correlated. This set-up generates two motives for trade. First, the
business cycle exposure of private investments creates a need for risk-sharing.
Second, unsophisticated investors cannot distinguish between the price eﬀects
of market and oﬀ-market private information. This leads to disagreement
about stock returns in equilibrium, even though unsophisticated investors
rationally extract information from prices. Both motives for trade vary with
the business cycle and thus entail persistent and cyclical equity ﬂows.
To capture local business cycles, we estimate stochastic processes for local
dividends. To infer the composition of investor populations, we use selected
moments of U.S.-based investors’ gross and net purchases, overall trading
volume, and returns. We ﬁnd that the populations of both local and U.S.-
based participants are heterogeneous. In line with previous literature, the
average U.S.-based participant has less local knowledge than the average local
participant. The cross-country diﬀerences between average trades, however,
is generally much smaller than the within-country diﬀerence between investor
types.
To see how the model accounts for the stylized facts, consider a typical
boom. As good news about the business cycle arrives, all investors update
their assessment of future cash ﬂows and stock prices begin to rise. At the
same time, sophisticated investors increasingly locate proﬁtable oﬀ-market
opportunities. To exploit private opportunities without unduly increasing
exposure to business cycle risk, they begin to sell stocks. With heterogeneous
investor populations, this generates both volume and, in international data,
a burst of gross trading activity. Moreover, since the average American is less
sophisticated than the average local investor, the U.S. population is buying
f o r e i g ns t o c k sa sp r i c e sa r er i s i n g .
The above “risk-sharing trades” are slowed down by disagreement: unso-
phisticated investors who have less information about the state of the business
cycle are initially less optimistic and will buy stocks only at a discount. A
string of favourable returns can help convince them that a boom is in full
swing. This leads, predictably, to a stronger inﬂow of unsophisticated, and
hence also American, money chasing returns. In contrast, sophisticated in-
vestors withdraw increasing amounts from the stock market as the peak is
approached. Only as the economy worsens and proﬁtable private opportu-
nities dry up do they return to the market. Again, the transition is slow as
unsophisticated investors, who were overly optimistic at the peak, gradually
2revise their opinion.
Except for the United Kingdom, the calibrated models do a good job in
matching the autocorrelation function of U.S. investors’ net purchases.2 In-
deed, the model predicts not only ﬂow momentum (positive autocorrelation
at short horizons of 1 to 3 quarters), but also ﬂow reversal,t h a ti s ,n e g a t i v e
autocorrelation at longer horizons (5 to 7 quarters). This prediction derives
from business cycle swings in trading; momentum and reversal are also fea-
tures of the persistent component of dividends. In the data, there is strong
evidence of ﬂow reversal in Canada, France, and Germany, and somewhat
weaker evidence of it in Japan and Italy. The models also do a good job for
the cross-correlogram of ﬂows and returns.
Return chasing is often cited as an example of “irrational” behaviour by
uninformed foreign investors. This view is countered by Bohn and Tesar
(1996), who construct estimates of expected local returns based on public
information. They show that American investors tend to buy precisely when
these expected returns are high. To further assess the performance of our
model, we replicate the Bohn-Tesar exercise in our model economies. We
consistently ﬁnd positive correlation between expected returns conditional
on public information and net purchases by U.S. investors. Our model may
thus be viewed as providing further support to the “rational” view of return
chasing.
Our model’s ability to match the dynamics of equity ﬂo w sr e l i e so nt w o
features that distinguish it from most other asymmetric information set-ups.
First, there are no noise traders. Many models use serially independent sup-
ply shocks (“noise trades”) as a device to guarantee disagreement between
traders in a rational-expectations equilibrium. However, noise trades are, by
construction, reversed after one period. This implies that they induce nega-
tive serial correlation in net purchases, a fact not observed in the data. In
our model, disagreement arises instead from an interplay of imperfect and
asymmetric information. The true state of the business cycle is not perfectly
observed by any investor. Since private opportunities are more proﬁtable in
booms, a high realized private return is a “good” private signal about the
business cycle, and hence about future dividends. This induces positive cor-
relation between unexpected private returns and stock returns. As a result,
sophisticated investors’ portfolio demands for stocks, and hence stock prices,
2W es u s p e c tt h a tt h ef a i l u r eo ft h em o d e lt oﬁt U.K. data is due to the importance of
London as an international ﬁnancial centre. This is discussed later in more detail.
3also depend on news about private opportunities that are orthogonal to the
business cycle. Unsophisticated investors are unable to distinguish such news
from business cycle shocks, which ensures disagreement. Since this mecha-
nism relies on the imperfect observation of persistent factors, it is consistent
with persistent trading activity.
Second, our model is based on fundamentals (the estimated dividend
process) that exhibit momentum and reversal. It is often taken for granted
that asymmetric information trivially generates serial correlation in ﬂows re-
gardless of what the fundamentals look like. This misleading intuition is
based on ﬁnite-horizon models of dynamic trading. Given initial disagree-
ment, such models generate a string of trades in the same direction as dis-
agreement is gradually resolved through learning by uninformed investors.
Importantly, this mechanism generates only conditional momentum in ﬂows,
given the initial disagreement. To calculate unconditional autocorrelations,
one needs to take into account how the economy reached the initial state of
disagreement. Our analysis clariﬁes that, if this occurs through a shock that
quickly reverts to the mean, trades are also quickly reversed in equilibrium,
which leads to negative unconditional autocorrelation! In our model, trades
are instead driven by business cycle shocks that have a hump-shaped impulse
response.3
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the related liter-
ature. Section 3 presents the model of equity trading. Section 4 discusses
the properties of equilibrium stock ﬂows and returns. Section 5 describes the
data used in documenting the facts and in the calibration. The calibration
and the quantitative results are reported in section 6. The appendixes solve
the model, detrend the data, and estimate the dividend process.
2. Related Literature
Although there is a large empirical literature on the joint distribution of
international equity ﬂows and returns, there are relatively few theoretical
3The persistence of U.S. net purchases, which can be positive or negative, is harder to
explain than the persistence of volume, which involves an absolute value. For example,
a sequence of independently, identically distributed (i.i.d.) noise trader holdings would
induce persistent volume, but successive net trades by investors would be negatively serially
correlated. Similarly, Wang’s (1994) model of trading volume, which is based on AR(1)
fundamentals, generates persistent volume, but negative serial correlation in ﬂows between
investor types.
4studies. We discuss both in turn.4
2.1 Empirical work
Two of the stylized facts we emphasize, ﬂow momentum (persistence) and
return chasing, are well known. Bohn and Tesar (1996) document persistence
in the U.S. Treasury aggregate data that are also the basis for our calibra-
tion. Froot and Tjornhom (2002) examine persistence in international trades
by individual mutual funds. Their analysis shows that the source of persis-
tence in aggregate mutual fund investment is asynchronous trading across
funds into individual countries. This result highlights the role of investor
heterogeneity also emphasized in our model.
Bohn and Tesar (1996) ﬁrst pointed out the return-chasing phenomenon,
documenting positive contemporaneous correlation of ﬂows and return at the
quarterly frequency. Later work (Bohn and Tesar 1995; Brennan and Cao
1997; Choe, Kho, and Stulz 1999; Froot, O’Connell, and Seasholes 2001)
shows that much of the contemporaneous correlation over longer periods is
due to positive correlation of ﬂows with lagged returns at higher frequencies.
We thus consider the result that returns predict ﬂows in our model to be
more important than the mere contemporaneous correlation between ﬂows
and returns.
Positive correlation of gross purchases and sales is observed by Albu-
querque, Bauer, and Schneider (2003), but has otherwise not received a great
deal of attention. It is an important fact, since it essentially rules out a large
class of models in international economics and ﬁnance in which representa-
tive agents in diﬀerent countries trade country stock indexes or accumulate
aggregate capital stocks.5 The prevalence of bursts of gross trading activity
suggests that this highly aggregated view is not an appropriate way to think
about capital ﬂows. In our model, gross trading activity is instead explained
by heterogeneity of investor populations.
Additional evidence on investor heterogeneity comes from the literature
on individual investor performance. There exists a large number of studies
4See Stulz (1999) for a comprehensive survey of both empirical and theoretical work.
5The only way for such models to be consistent with the ﬂow data would be a strong
time-aggregation eﬀect. Albuquerque, Bauer, and Schneider (2003), however, document
that positive correlation between gross purchases and sales also exists at the monthly
frequency.
5that use data on individual trades to examine whether local investors outper-
form foreigners or vice versa. This literature has not been conclusive, with
s t r o n gr e s u l t si nb o t hd i r e c t i o n s ,d e p e n d i n go nt h et i m ep e r i o da n dt h ed a t a
set used.6 This is what one would expect if there is indeed investor hetero-
geneity. In addition, some studies provide direct evidence of heterogeneity.
In Finnish data, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) ﬁnd diﬀerences in trading
behaviour between domestic household investors and domestic institutions.
Choe, Kho, and Stulz (2001) analyze the trading behaviour of foreign in-
vestors (U.S. and others) and domestic institutions and individuals around
days of signiﬁcant abnormal returns and days of large buying or selling activ-
ity in Korea. They ﬁnd that foreign investors trade at worse prices relative
to domestic individuals, but not relative to domestic institutions.
2.2 Theoretical work
The structure of our model is similar to that in Wang’s (1994) seminal pa-
per on trading volume. In Wang’s model, some agents who obtain private
information also invest in a private asset. While the expected returns on
the private asset are perfectly observed by informed investors and indepen-
dent of dividends, a non-revealing rational-expectations equilibrium occurs
if dividends are correlated with unexpected returns on the private asset. In
contrast, our model relies on imperfect information by all investors and on a
more general factor structure required to match the data. This gives rise to
ad i ﬀerent argument for non-revelation, as discussed above.
While there are a number of models of foreign equity holdings, in partic-
ular the home bias, the theoretical literature on ﬂows is relatively recent.7
6For studies that suggest an advantage for domestic traders, see Frankel and Schmukler
(1996) for Mexico, and Hau (2001) for Germany. Hamao and Mei (2001) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
e v i d e n c et h a tf o r e i g n e r sa r ea b l et ot i m et h eJ a p a n e s es t o c km a r k e t .
In contrast, Seasholes (2000) ﬁnds that foreign investors in Taiwan systematically accu-
mulate assets before positive earnings announcements, and systematically sell assets before
negative earnings announcements. Bailey and Mao (2001) analyze periods of earnings and
dividends announcements in Thailand and Singapore and ﬁnd evidence consistent with
foreigners having superior information compared with domestic residents. Froot and Ra-
madorai (2001) show that unexpected inﬂows into closed-end funds cause an increase in
the prices of both the net asset value of the fund and that of the fund itself, indicating that
foreign investors have signiﬁcant private information. Karolyi (1999) shows that foreign
investors have outperformed domestic investors in Japan.
7For a survey of the home-bias literature, see Lewis (1999).
6Brennan and Cao (1997) ﬁrst emphasized the contemporaneous correlation
of ﬂows and returns. In their model, foreign investors are less informed than
domestic investors. This not only generates home bias, but it also implies
that foreign investors react more to public information. If private information
accumulates slowly, their model predicts positive contemporaneous correla-
tion of foreigners’ net purchases and returns, as in the data. The overreaction
eﬀect stressed by Brennan and Cao also exists in our model: unsophisticated
investors mistake a temporary shock to dividends for a persistent shock and
become net buyers. Since this type of shock is temporary, it is quickly re-
versed and contributes negatively to the autocorrelation of ﬂows. For our
calibrated models, variance decompositions show that this limits the contri-
bution of temporary dividend shocks relative to the persistent business cycle
shocks discussed above.
Brennan and Cao (1997) do not analyze the ﬂow dynamics implied by
their model. Similarly, Coval (1999), who studies a quantitative two-country
model with asymmetrically informed investors, does not use his model to
consider any of the stylized facts we examine. Hau and Rey (2002) develop
a model of international equity ﬂows in the presence of exchange rate risk
and a price-elastic supply of foreign exchange, according to which a euro
appreciation (say, relative to the U.S. dollar) decreases the excess supply of
euros. Their model does well in explaining correlations between currency
and equity returns. It fails to deliver positive contemporaneous correlation
between foreign investors’ net purchases and local returns, however, because
foreign investors sell local equities when local equity returns are high but
local currency returns are low.
Griﬃn, Nardari, and Stulz (2002) study at w o - c o u n t r ym o d e lt oe x p l a i n
the daily behavior of ﬂows and returns in emerging markets. They gener-
ate return chasing by assuming that foreigners have “extrapolative expecta-
tions,” which they argue could be caused by irrational or updating behaviour.
They also emphasize wealth eﬀects that make stock prices in a country de-
pend on factors other than domestic fundamentals. In our model, unsophis-
ticated investors optimally have extrapolative expectations, because stock
prices depend on a factor that is uncorrelated with domestic dividends: the
orthogonal component to the proﬁtability of oﬀ-market opportunities.
73. The Model
In this section, we ﬁrst describe a model of a small open economy in which
sophisticated and unsophisticated investors trade stocks. We then derive
expressions for various statistics of trading activity when investors belong to
two heterogeneous populations identiﬁed by nationality. In particular, the




There is a continuum of inﬁnitely lived investors. A fraction, νu, of in-
vestors is unsophisticated (indexed by u), while a fraction, 1−νu, is sophis-
ticated (indexed by s). Investors have identical expected utility preferences
that exhibit constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). At time t, an investor
















where β<1 is the discount factor, γ>0 is the coeﬃcient of absolute risk
aversion, and Ii
t is the information set at time t,t ob es p e c i ﬁed below.
3.1.2 Investment opportunities
There are three assets that are available to all investors. First, a risk-free
bond pays a gross rate of return of Rf. Second, a risky “world asset” pays
a per-dollar excess return of RW
t in period t. Third, all investors participate
in the domestic stock market. The single asset traded in this market is
a claim to the dividend stream {Dt}.A t d a t e t, shares trade at a per-
share ex-dividend price of Pt, and hence deliver a per-share excess return of
RD
t = Pt + Dt − RfPt−1. A single share is traded every period. A fourth
asset is accessible to sophisticated investors alone; we refer to it as a private
investment opportunity and denote its per-dollar excess return by RB
t .
Dividends and asset returns are subject to both persistent and transitory
shocks. Let FD
t denote the persistent component of dividends. Returns on
8private opportunities are predictable and the expected return is correlated
with dividends: it is likely to depend on the local business cycle. Other
ﬂuctuations in the expected return on the private opportunity are summa-
rized by a state variable, FB
t , independent of FD
t . Both state variables can








distribution of dividends and returns is summarized by8





















Ft = ρFt−1 + ε
F
t . (5)
Variables with bars denote unconditional means. All shocks are components









¢0 that is serially uncorrelated
and normally distributed with mean zero and covariance matrix
P
εε . In






are block diagonal and εF
t is uncor-
related with all other shocks. The shock ε
y
t is described below.
3.1.3 Information
At date t, all investors know past and present stock prices and dividends,
as well as returns on the world asset. The unsophisticated investors have







investors not only know Iu
t , but they also observe (i) past and present returns
on their private opportunities; (ii) the factor FB





t, about the persistent component of dividends, where ε
y
t is uncorrelated
with all other shocks. All sophisticated investors observe the same signals.
































holdings and returns of assets that are available to investor i. In particular,
8We use bold print for vectors and matrices.





































vestor i chooses contingent plans for consumption, {ci
l}
∞





l=t , to maximize expected utility (1), conditional on the information set
Ii
t and the budget constraints (6).
3.1.5 Equilibrium







t,P t} for consumption, asset holdings, and the domestic stock
price such that (i) both types of agents choose optimal portfolios and con-
sumption, given prices, and (ii) the domestic stock market clears:
νuθ
Du
t +( 1− νu)θ
Ds
t =1 . (7)
A key feature of this equilibrium is that agents look at current and past prices
to update their beliefs about variables they do not observe. In particular,
unsophisticated investors will try to learn from prices about the return on
private opportunities and the signal ys
t, which sophisticated investors get
about the persistent component of dividends.
3.1.6 International equity ﬂows
T oa p p l yt h em o d e lt od a t ao nU . S .i n v e s t o r s ’t r a d e si ni n t e r n a t i o n a l
markets, we assume that there are two investor nationalities. One consists
of all investors that have accounts based in the United States. We refer
to the other group as “local” investors. It is natural to permit both the
United States and the local population to contain both sophisticated and
unsophisticated types. Let νUS denote the measure of U.S. investors and let
νuUS denote the fraction of unsophisticated U.S. investors relative to all U.S.












In our model, trade is due only to the heterogeneity of sophisticated and
unsophisticated investors. The market-clearing condition (7) thus implies
that we can write all relevant statistics in terms of the holdings or trades of
one type. We choose to express everything in terms of unsophisticated in-

















Our model diﬀers from standard small open-economy models in that the
expected return on the domestic stock market is endogenous, while the risk-
less rate, the world asset return, and the return on the oﬀ-market asset are
taken as exogenous. In other words, we do not assume that there is one (ex-
ogenous) pricing kernel that can be used to price all assets. The simplest way
to interpret our set-up is that there is market segmentation. The domestic
market is used by domestic investors as well as by a subset of U.S. investors
who are themselves small relative to the U.S. market. The world asset (say,
the U.S. stock market index) is priced by the majority of U.S. investors who
do not participate in the country under consideration.
Our approach thus assumes that equity home bias exists, and that it
exists because of limited U.S. participation in foreign markets. Our goal is
not to explain the world distribution of holdings of all assets, but trades
in the stock market under consideration, conditional on home bias. We
thus model participants in only that market. We also make the simplifying
assumption that the world return is unpredictable and that unexpected world
returns are uncorrelated with any other shock. That is, εW
t is independent
of all other shocks in εt. This assumption is counterfactual for industrial
c o u n t r i e s ,a n di tc o u l dber e l a x e dt oa c c o m m od a t eac o m m o nf a c t o ri nr e t u r n s
and fundamentals.9 However, it is not clear how important this extension
would be for the properties of ﬂows we are interested in. The mechanisms
stressed below would still be present in the richer model. Moreover, Bohn
and Tesar (1996) document that there is only a weak relationship between
U.S. investors’ international equity ﬂows and U.S. equity returns.
We refer broadly to the fourth asset as “private investment opportuni-
ties,” which means investment opportunities that: (i) become available to
a subset of market participants that is also well-informed about the market
itself, and (ii) are too costly to observe and access for all other market par-
ticipants. Concrete examples of such opportunities abound in private equity,
real estate, foreign exchange, or derivatives markets. Importantly, our model
9See Dumas, Harvey, and Ruiz (2002) for a model of world stock returns and output
that emphasizes cross-country correlation.
11does not require that the type of opportunity always be the same. All that
matters is that, from time to time, the well-informed part of the population
discover some new way to make money that is not known to everybody.
Lack of knowledge by unsophisticated investors can have diﬀerent mean-
ings. One possibility is simply that the private opportunity is secret. More
generally, one can think of unsophisticated investors as people who concen-
trate on only a subset of the available public information. Even though, in
principle, there may be data on the latest “hot” opportunity that sophis-
ticated investors exploit, unsophisticated investors, who are not sure where
to look, prefer to focus on stock market information that they know how to
process. In our model, they process this information optimally: they know
the stochastic processes for prices and update their beliefs by Bayes’ rule.
The ability of sophisticated investors to recognize investment opportunities
that are not readily (or costlessly) available to unsophisticated investors is
also included in Merton (1987) and Shapiro (2002).
We have assumed that sophisticated investors have better information
about the persistent component of dividends. Sophisticated investors are
thus agents who are better at analyzing medium-term prospects. This is
an important part of our set-up. An alternative assumption would be to
let the signal depend simply on future dividends. In that case, information
would concern at least in part the short-term noise in dividends. More trades
based on private information would follow news about noise, inducing more
negative serial correlation in ﬂows. In our calibration below, we decompose
our estimated dividend process into a persistent and a transitory component.
The precision of the signal ys
t then regulates the knowledge of sophisticated
investors relative to the econometrician.
3.2 Stationary equilibria
Let ˆ Fi
t = E [Ft|Ii
t] denote investor i0s conditional expectation of the vector
Ft that drives persistent movements in fundamentals. Since Iu
t ⊂ Is
t,t h el a w







.I no t h e rw o r d s ,ˆ Fu
t is the
unsophisticated investors’ expectation of what sophisticated investors expect
Ft to be. We focus on equilibria in which the price can be written as a linear
function of these expectations:









12for some constants ¯ π, πs,a n dπu.
Theorem 1 There exists a rational expectations equilibrium such that the
price satisﬁes (9). Equilibrium prices and asset holdings are stationary. In-
vestor i0s equilibrium stock holdings take the form
θ
Di





The equilibrium has two important properties. First, equilibrium prices
do not reﬂect the true values of the persistent components of dividends or
private returns, but only investors’ perceptions of them. This diﬀers from
Wang (1994), where some investors have full information and are likely to
generate additional trading volume as the asymmetry of information across
agents is decreased. Second, holdings of both sophisticated and unsophis-
ticated investors depend only on unsophisticated investors’ estimates of the
persistent factors, ˆ Fu
t. Trading of sophisticated investors thus diﬀers from
trading of unsophisticated investors because of the weights placed on each of
these factors. We return to this later.
Appendix A provides a complete proof of Theorem 1. The main argument
can be summarized as follows. Consider ﬁrst the agents’ payoﬀ-relevant
information. Suppose the information sets Ii
t contain only normal random
variables. This implies normality of the conditional expectations, ˆ Fi
t,a n d ,






t , ˆ Fu0
t
´0
is a suﬃcient statistic for forecasting all future returns,




t = ˆ Fu
t is a suﬃcient statistic for forecasting returns given the
information set Iu
t . This includes one-step-ahead returns, since the current
price can be written as a function of ˆ Fu
t. Indeed, unsophisticated investors
know ˆ Fu
t, so that observing the price is the same as observing the signal
y
u




















t, and we can write the price as
Pt =¯ π +( π0
s + π0
u) ˆ Fu
t. It follows that the state vector φ
i
t captures the
payoﬀ-relevant information of investor i0s problem regarding consumption,
savings, and portfolio choice.
An important feature of exponential utility is that optimal portfolios are
independent of wealth and linear in the agents’ state vector: θ
i




t. The coeﬃcients ¯ θ
i and Θi will typically depend on the distribution of
the exogenous variables, as well as the price coeﬃcients ¯ π,πu, and πs. The
equilibrium condition requires that the price coeﬃcients satisfy
νu¯ θ
Du +( 1− νu)¯ θ
Ds =1 ,
νuΘ




Fu is the subvector of ΘDs that corresponds to ˆ Fu
t, with the remain-
ing elements of the vector ΘDs set to zero. Finding an equilibrium thus boils
down to solving a non-linear system of equations in the price coeﬃcients.
4. Characterizing Equilibrium Flows and
Returns
In this section, we discuss analytically some properties of equilibria. We ﬁrst
discuss how beliefs evolve and why disagreement can persist in equilibrium.
We then establish properties of stock pricing. Finally, we calculate statistics
that we use to calibrate the model and evaluate its account of the stylized
facts.
4.1 The evolution of beliefs
Investors in our model economy continually learn about the state of the
business cycle and the availability of private opportunities from observing
prices, dividends, and private signals. Since all state variables are normal
and homoscedastic, the evolution of investors’ beliefs can be described by
tracking conditional expectations, using the Kalman ﬁlter. The resulting
equations clarify why disagreement can arise in equilibrium and how diﬀerent
agents over- or underestimate shocks.
4.1.1 Filtering
Sophisticated investors learn about the state of the business cycle by
observing dividends, returns on their private opportunities, and their pri-
vate signal. They do not learn from the price, since they already know ˆ Fs
t
and hence ˆ Fu
t. We collect their “relevant” observables in a vector, os
t =
14¡
Dt − ¯ D, ys
t,R B
t − ¯ RB − ηBFB
t
¢






Equations (5) and (11) form a state-space system. Sophisticated investors’
conditional expectation of the state vector, ˆ Fs
t, then takes the form
ˆ F
s

















where Ks is a steady-state Kalman gain matrix.11
Unsophisticated investors obtain valuable information from dividends as
well as from the signal, yu
t , contained in prices; i.e., ou
t =
¡















Equations (12) and (13) form the state-space system of unsophisticated in-
vestors. Their conditional expectation, and hence their state variable, φ
u
t,
can be written as
ˆ F
u




























The law of motion of sophisticated investors’ state variable, φ
s
t, is summarized
by (12) and (14).
4.1.2 Non-revealing prices
Since the stock price acts as a signal, the information structure in the
model is endogenous. We say that investors agree about the stock market
if their conditional distributions of future stock payoﬀsa r et h es a m e .T h i s
10Because the world return, RW
t , is uncorrelated with everything else, it does not add
any relevant information.
11Importantly, the matrix Mose allows errors in the observation equation to be correlated
with errors in the state equation.














, where e1 is the ﬁrst unit
vector.
15is certainly true in the symmetric information benchmark, where investors
are assumed to agree on all state variables: ˆ Fu
t = ˆ Fs
t . Agreement about
the stock market, however, could also arise endogenously in our asymmetric
information set-up if prices were to reveal all relevant information about
stocks.13
Agreement about the stock market cannot occur in the linear equilib-
rium of Theorem 1. In our set-up, equilibria are “non-revealing,” because
(i) the business cycle component (FD
t ) is not perfectly observed by the so-
phisticated investor, and (ii) the expected private return depends on the
business cycle. Private returns (RB
t ) are a signal of the state of the business
cycle, and surprise moves in RB





t−1. Because prices depend (at least) on these variables, sophisticated
investors must perceive unexpected returns on stocks and private opportu-
nities as correlated.14 This implies that the price cannot be independent of
expected private returns, and hence ˆ F
B,s
t .
With a price that depends on both ˆ FD,s and ˆ FB,s, unsophisticated in-
vestors cannot distinguish signals about the business cycle from signals rel-
evant to private returns only. Suppose that, initially, agents were in agree-
ment: ˆ Fu
t−1 = ˆ Fs
t−1. By (12), sophisticated investors would then update
according to the four-dimensional innovation vector, ˆ ε
s
t. Unsophisticated in-







. For example, high prices
could signal either good news about dividends or bad news about private
return opportunities.
4.1.3 Disagreement about the state of the business cycle









i = u,s, are key determinants of equilibrium ﬂows and returns. The Kalman
ﬁlter equations show how these conditional expectations react to shocks.
We say that an investor overreacts (underreacts) to a shock if ˆ FD,i moves
more (less) than the actual state variable, FD. As a general rule, inference
13Agreement about the stock market is thus weaker than symmetric information. It
already occurs if ˆ F
D,u
t = ˆ F
D,s
t and the stock price is independent of ˆ FB,s and ˆ FB,u,
even though unsophisticated investors do not know about private returns (which are not
relevant to them).
14We do not require correlation between dividend shocks and unexpected returns on
private opportunities under the true distribution. This is in contrast to Wang (1994),
where this correlation is key to obtaining non-revelation. His model does not have the
features (i) and (ii) noted for our model.
16about slow-moving state variables from data contaminated by temporary
noise induces overreaction to temporary shocks, but underreaction to persis-
tent shocks to the state variable. In our model, both types of investors have





With asymmetric information, shocks also induce disagreement. For ex-
ample, consider a positive shock to the persistent component of dividends
(εFD
t ). It is reﬂected in the dividend, observed by both investors. In addi-
tion, sophisticated investors obtain information about it from their private
signal. In contrast, unsophisticated investors see only the indirect signal con-
tained in the price. In a non-revealing equilibrium, this is contaminated by
other shocks. Sophisticated investors underreact less: they underestimate
FD
t by less than sophisticated investors. As a result, sophisticated investors
become more optimistic. The response to a positive temporary shock to divi-
dends produces the opposite result: both investors see the dividend increase,
but sophisticated investors do not see an unusual movement in their private
signal. This causes them to assign lower probability to the fact that FD
t has
moved. It follows that unsophisticated investors become more optimistic.
A positive persistent shock to private returns is fully observed by sophis-
ticated investors. Unsophisticated investors, on the other hand, see only
a noisy signal of it through a lower price level. Because the lower stock
price could also have been caused by a negative business cycle shock, unso-
phisticated investors end up underestimating the business cycle, increasing
disagreement. Finally, a temporary shock to private returns will generate
a noisy signal of the business cycle to sophisticated investors–as they ob-
serve the private return–and to unsophisticated investors–as they observe
the stock price move. Such a shock causes sophisticated investors to under-
estimate the business cycle by more if unexpected shocks to dividends and
private returns are positively correlated.
4.2 Optimal portfolio choice
In Appendix A, we solve investor i0s consumption and portfolio choice prob-
lem, given the law of motion for φ
i




























17where ˜ γ = γ
Rf−1
Rf and Ui is positive deﬁnite. Risk-averse investors care
not only about ﬂuctuations in wealth, but also about changes in beliefs,
captured by the state vector φ
i
t. The quadratic term reﬂects investors’ taste
for “unusual” investment opportunities.15
With this value function, portfolio demand is linear in investors’ state
variables. To gain intuition about equilibrium holdings and trades, let Xt+1 =



















,w h e r eadjusted conditional distributions are used for both



















































For both types, the ﬁrst term captures responses to changes in one-period-
ahead expected excess returns. It is relevant even if investors are myopic.
Unsophisticated investors’ myopic demand is simply proportional to expected
per-share stock returns. In contrast, as long as stock and private returns are
correlated, sophisticated investors’ myopic demand also depends on expected
private returns. In our numerical examples, stocks and private opportunities
are substitutes (ρs > 0), since they move together with the business cycle.
This tends to lower sophisticated investors’ demand for stocks.
The “intertemporal hedging demand” of the investors is due to their con-
cern with movements in the state variables, φ
i
t.I n v e s t o ri eﬀectively behaves
15Some intuition can be obtained by considering the case of one state variable. In this
case, Ui is a positive number and continuation utility is higher the further φ
i
t is from its
mean of zero. Since φ
i
t is payoﬀ-relevant, it drives expected returns at some time in the
future. An unusual value signals that above-average expected returns will be available, by
going either long or short.
16In the current discrete-time setting, the covariance matrix of returns has to be adjusted
to account for agents’ taste for future unusual state variables as measured through the
vector φ
i
t. This is described in detail in Appendix A.
18as if they were holding a portfolio of non-tradable assets with return vec-
tor φ
i
t+1. Under this interpretation, the time-varying vector of shares held








. Since investors fear states of
poor investment opportunities, they favour assets that pay oﬀ in precisely
these states: the average hedging demand, ¯ hi, is particularly high for such
assets. Moreover, since investors desire unusual opportunities, their exposure
to a state variable increases if that state variable is expected to take on an
unusual value.17 This gives rises to the time-varying hedging demand, Hiφ
i
t.
4.3 Equilibrium prices, predictability, and hedging
In our numerical results below, (i) the local stock price depends strongly and
positively on the level and change in the local business cycle, (ii) the local
stock price depends weakly and negatively on the level and change in the oﬀ-
market factor, and (iii) consideration of intertemporal hedging is crucial for
understanding the behaviour of sophisticated investors, whereas it is largely
irrelevant for unsophisticated investors. These properties of the model are
closely connected. To see this, it is helpful to ﬁrst write the equilibrium price
as a weighted average of two hypothetical prices, Pu
t and Ps
t , that would arise
in economies inhabited by only one type of agent.
4.3.1 Decomposition of a stock price





















































t behaves like the price in a representative-agent model with
no private opportunities: it equals the present discounted payoﬀ minus a
17More generally, with a vector of state variables, exposure to, say, the ﬁrst element
increases if “complementary” elements are expected to be high. Complementary elements
are those for which the product with the ﬁrst element yields high utility.
18Of course, the payoﬀs and the distribution of the state variables would also be diﬀerent
in the hypothetical representative-agent economies. The point is that the structure of the
price equations is the same.
19risk premium that consists of a constant “myopic” premium, βγσ2
u, less the
intertemporal hedging demand. This suggests that the presence of unsophis-
ticated investors tends to reduce time variation in risk premiums. Indeed,
since unsophisticated investors have no access to private opportunities, their
hedging demand can come only from the predictability of excess local stock
returns. If expected excess returns are close to constant, the same is true
for the hedging demand. By (18), price changes will then mostly reﬂect
changes in the expected present value, and expected excess returns must
indeed be close to constant. This logic implies low predictability for an ac-
tual representative-agent economy with unsophisticated investors. The result
carries over to our model if the number of unsophisticated investors is large
enough.
In contrast, the price Ps
t behaves like the price in an economy where
all stockholders are entrepreneurs who run a private business in addition
to investing in the stock market. The risk premium contains an additional
“myopic” component that depends on the time-varying expected private re-
turn. Since ρs is positive in the equilibria we consider, this premium is also
positive.19 Equation (18) clariﬁes how predictability in private returns can
s p i l lo v e rt ot h es t o c km a r k e tt op r o d u c et i m ev a r i a t i o ni ne x p e c t e ds t o c kr e -
turns. With positive perceived correlation between private and public equity
returns, sophisticated investors who face temporarily high expected private
returns will want less exposure to business cycle risk common to both as-
sets, and hence demand higher risk premiums on stocks.20 In addition, since
entrepreneurs optimize dynamically, their hedging demand depends on the
correlation of stock returns with the future investment opportunities. This
can further contribute to time variation in risk premiums.
The weight, ˜ νu, on the “unsophisticated price,” Pu
t , depends on the un-
sophisticated investors’ overall ability to “move the market.” It therefore
depends not only (positively) on the number of unsophisticated participants,
but also on their average stock holdings relative to those held by sophisti-
cated investors. Relative holdings, in turn, are directly related to the relative
precision of information about stock payoﬀs. If unsophisticated investors per-
ceive much more uncertainty about stocks (σ2
u >> σ2
s), they will hold a lower
19The literature on the equity premium has recently argued that ρs is positive because
private equity returns are correlated with the business cycle. See, for example, Heaton
and Lucas (2000).
20This also explains why, for sophisticated investors, the relevant payoﬀ variance is only












u +( 1− νu)/σ2
s (1 − ρ2
s)
.
If information is symmetric and private returns are independent of stock





4.3.2 Stock price variation and the business cycle
A simple example shows why the state variables of the business cycle,
ˆ F
D,i
t and ∆ ˆ F
D,i
t−1, are typically much more important for equilibrium stock
price movements and predictability than the orthogonal oﬀ-market factors
FB
t and ∆FB
t−1 that change only expected private returns. We conjecture
properties for the price function for period t+1that determine payoﬀs Xt+1,
and then verify the same properties for the price Pt in (18). Suppose that
the future stock price, Pt+1, depends positively on the perceived state of the
business cycle, ˆ FDi
t , as well as the perceived change, ∆ ˆ FDi
t , for i = u,s.
Suppose also that Pt+1 depends less, and negatively, on ˆ FBi
t , as well as the
perceived change ∆ ˆ FBi
t , for i = u,s.
Pi
t also depends positively on ˆ F
D,i
t and ∆ ˆ F
D,i
t because expected payoﬀs
in Pi
t depend positively on ˆ F
D,i
t and ∆ ˆ F
D,i
t , and these factors are persistent.
There are, however, three counteracting eﬀects. The ﬁrst comes from the
risk premium in Pu
t , if there is enough predictability of stock returns in
equilibrium. The other two eﬀects occur because a boom today signals higher
private returns tomorrow, and it increases the risk premium on local stocks
for sophisticated investors (through Ps
t ). The risk premium increases via the
myopic demand because of the substitutability across assets; it increases via
a lower hedging demand because the exposure of sophisticated investors to
these state variables–which are positively correlated with stock returns–
also increases. Although these counteracting eﬀects exist, it is plausible that
there are equilibria in which they are outweighed by the present value eﬀect.
This will certainly be true if the number of unsophisticated investors is large
enough.








on prices is limited by the fact
that the direct eﬀect oﬀsets the hedging-demand eﬀect on the risk premium.
Indeed, an increase in ˆ F
B,s
t raises the risk premium, since it increases the cur-








21implies that high current values of these variables increase investors’ expo-
sure to them in the future. Since they are negatively correlated with stock
returns, this increases the hedging demand for stocks and reduces the risk
premium. In all our calibrations, the direct eﬀect dominates, so that the
negative dependence of prices on these factors is validated. The price co-
eﬃcients, however, are much smaller than for the business cycle variables.
Stock market booms are thus essentially driven by expectations of future
cash ﬂows. Essentially all predictability in equilibrium stock returns can be
traced to business cycle movements.
4.4 Equilibrium ﬂows and returns
In this section, we decompose equilibrium trades into disagreement and risk-
sharing components. We then show how these motives for trade impact key
statistics of the joint distribution of ﬂows and returns that are relevant to
the stylized facts we are interested in.
4.4.1 Motives for trade: disagreement and risk-sharing
Substituting expression (18) for the equilibrium stock price back into the
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Trading volume and international equity ﬂows are thus driven by relative
changes in the valuations of the two types, captured by the hypothetical
prices Pu
t and Ps
t .D i ﬀerences in valuations arise for two reasons. The ﬁrst
is simply disagreement about future payoﬀs: unsophisticated investors are
net buyers in periods when they become relatively more optimistic than
sophisticated investors.
22Second, there is trade due to changes in the need for risk-sharing. When
sophisticated investors perceive higher expected returns on private opportu-
nities, they prefer to reduce exposure to the business cycle. They thus sell
the local asset and unsophisticated investors buy. The eﬀect is not limited to
the myopic demand for stocks: the intertemporal hedging demand will typ-
ically also change. As discussed above, the key diﬀerences in hedging needs
across types arise precisely from the presence of private opportunities.
4.4.2 Flow momentum, reversal, and volatility
To examine ﬂow momentum and reversal, we calculate the autocorrelation
function of U.S. investors’ net purchases of local equities. From (8), these net
































. The emergence of ﬂow momentum and ﬂow reversal
in equilibrium is thus independent of the population parameters: it depends
only on the properties of trade across investor types. In other words, the dy-
namics of U.S. investors’ net purchases is characterized by the disagreement
and risk-sharing motives.
The composition of investor populations does matter for the volatility of
ﬂows, a fact that is used in our calibration strategy. The standard devia-


















In the knife-edge case, where the U.S. population is a scaled version of the
total population (νuUS = νu), holdings of U.S. investors are constant and
net ﬂows are zero. Of course, there can still be substantial gross ﬂows if
the population of U.S. investors is heterogeneous with respect to investor
sophistication.
4.4.3 Return chasing
We examine the relationship between ﬂows and returns in two ways. First,
we consider the cross-correlogram of U.S. investors’ net purchases and local
23returns. As (20) shows, the correlation of ﬂows and returns depends on



















Whenever νuUS >ν u, there are proportionately more unsophisticated in-
vestors in the population of U.S. international investors than in the local
population. Holdings and net purchases of U.S. investors are then per-
fectly correlated with those of unsophisticated investors. In contrast, when
νuUS <ν u, U.S. investors track sophisticated investors.
A second way to examine return chasing is to examine the risk premium
measured by an econometrician who constructs estimates of expected re-
turns conditional on public information. The econometrician will thus re-
cover Eu
t RD
t+1, which can then be related to equilibrium trades (19).
4.4.4 Bursts of gross trading activity
To determine properties of U.S. investors’ gross trading activity, it is
helpful to ﬁrst calculate moments of aggregate trading volume in the local
market. A natural measure of volume is the turnover of shares. Since every
t r a d ei sa ne x c h a n g eo fs h a r e sb e t w e e nt h et w ot y p e so fi n v e s t o r s ,w ec a n
deﬁne trading volume as:









With normally distributed holdings, there are closed-form expressions for the












2 E (Vo l t).
Gross purchases by U.S. investors in period t are determined by the type
of investor that is a net buyer during the period. Let 1∆θDu
t >0 denote the
indicator function for the event that unsophisticated investors are net buyers;
that is, ∆θ
Du




























E (Vo l t).
24Mean gross purchases are thus proportional to mean volume.21
5. Data
In this section, we describe the data and explain how they are compared with
model output. We focus on quarterly data from the G-7 countries–apart
from the United States, these are Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom,
France, Canada, and Italy–over the period 1977Q1 through 2000Q3. We
have selected these countries because they best ﬁt the assumptions of our
model. First, ﬂows and returns in these countries are likely to be driven by
stable economic relationships.22 In contrast, the ongoing process of liberal-
ization of equity markets in developing countries may lead to capital ﬂows
that are driven by changing risk-sharing opportunities or declining transac-
tions costs.23 In addition, the absence of trading frictions in our model is
more at odds with the institutional environment of emerging markets.
5.1 Dividends
We use data on the dividend yield and the price index of Datastream’s in-
ternational stock market indexes, with all variables converted to constant
U.S. dollars. Not surprisingly, per-share dividends exhibit a trend. To ob-
tain a stationary forcing process (Dt) for our model, we follow Campbell and
Kyle (1993) in removing an exponential trend. This is described in detail in
Appendix B, where we show that it is consistent with our normalization of
ﬂows, discussed below.
Table 1 reports key ﬁrst and second moments of detrended dividends.
We have chosen units such that the price index in 1977Q1 equals market
capitalization. Mean dividends thus reﬂect the sizes of the diﬀerent stock
markets. Importantly, mean dividends are more than 3.5 standard deviations
above zero for all countries except Italy. There is thus no problem with
21The model also predicts that mean gross sales are equal to mean gross purchases, since
the mean of net purchases is zero.
22While there has been some increase in correlation of stock index returns recently,
Brooks and Del Negro (2002) argue that this is a temporary phenomenon connected to an
“IT bubble,” rather than a permanent shift in market structure.
23See Bekaert and Harvey (2003) for a survey of emerging-markets ﬁnance.
25modelling the dividend as normally distributed in levels.24
Preliminary speciﬁcation analysis of the dynamic behaviour of dividends
reveals two features. First, the autocorrelation function switches from posi-
tive to negative values after 3 to 4 quarters. Second, while the ﬁrst two partial
autocorrelation coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant for all countries except Canada, all
countries exhibit several signiﬁcant partial autocorrelation coeﬃcients be-
yond the ﬁrst two. To accommodate both properties in a parsimonious way,
we follow the system (2) to (5) above, and decompose dividends into a per-
sistent cyclical component, captured by an AR(2) process, and a transitory
shock:
















t are uncorrelated i.i.d. sequences of shocks with zero mean
and standard deviations, σεD and σεFD, respectively. FD
t captures the oscil-
latory behaviour of the correlogram that is typical of variables aﬀected by
the business cycle. The presence of the transitory noise, εD
t , that cannot be
distinguished from the underlying business cycle movement implies that lags
longer than 2 quarters are still helpful in forecasting dividends.
To estimate this process, we use the fact that it permits an ARMA(2,2)
representation
¡








Dt−2 − ¯ D
¢
+ ut + λ1ut−1 + λ2ut−2,
where ut is an i.i.d. sequence of shocks with standard deviation σu, and
where the parameters satisfy a set of non-linear constraints. Details of the
estimation procedure are provided in Appendix C, where we also provide
expressions for σεD and σεFD in terms of the ARMA(2,2) parameters. Table
2 lists the estimation results and some properties of the estimated dividend
process.
The persistent component is stationary: the roots of the autoregressive
polynomial are outside the unit circle. In most countries, the roots are com-
plex, which accounts for oscillations in the correlogram. In addition, the
24Strictly speaking, we are assuming that the “true” dividend process follows a trun-
cated normal distribution. The model is thus an approximation. Table 1 shows that this
approximation is very sensible.







t−1 − (1 − a1 − a2)Ft−1 + ε
FD
t .
For all countries, we have that 0 < (−a2) < 1 and that (1 − a1 − a2) is a
small positive number. Two counteracting eﬀects are thus at work after a
shock hits. First, any change in a certain direction leads to more changes in
the same direction, although at a decreasing rate, since (−a2) < 1.I f t h i s
was the only eﬀect, the level FD
t would be non-stationary. The second term,
however, causes mean reversion in the level, pulling FD
t towards its mean of
zero whenever it is positive, and pulling it up when it is negative. In the
impulse response of the level, the ﬁrst eﬀect will dominate early on, before
the second eﬀect takes over. The result is a hump-shaped impulse-response
function.
The persistent component explains almost all the variation in dividends:
its share of total variance is larger than 96 per cent for all countries except
Italy. For three of the seven countries, the volatilities of the shocks that hit
the persistent component in any given quarter are also higher than those of
transitory shocks. Still, changes in dividends are typically less persistent than
changes in the persistent component. Changes in dividends can be decom-
posed into changes in the persistent component, which are positively serially
correlated, and changes in the temporary component, which are negatively
serially correlated and thus reduce overall persistence.
5.2 Equity ﬂows
5.2.1 Sources
We obtain data on the international equity ﬂows of U.S. investors from
the Treasury International Capital (TIC) reporting system of the U.S. Trea-
sury.25 Financial institutions (banks, bank holding companies, securities
brokers, dealers, and non-banking enterprises) must report to the Treasury,
25A number of related studies use the same data set: Tesar and Werner (1993, 1995),
Bohn and Tesar (1996), Brennan and Cao (1997), and Albuquerque, Bauer, and Schneider
(2003). See Froot, O’Connell, and Seasholes (2001) and Levich (1994) for a description of
the limitations and advantages of U.S. Treasury data.
27each month, by country, on all of their transactions with foreigners in long-
term securities (e.g., stocks and bonds), if their aggregate purchases or sales
total more than US$2 million in the month. As a result, the Treasury re-
ceives comprehensive data on cross-border equity transactions for most U.S.
investors. The Treasury collects data by geographic centre and not by the
country of origin of the security. This means that the data can be unrep-
resentative for countries that have large international ﬁnancial centres, such
as the United Kingdom. Warnock and Cleaver (2002) examine the TIC data
in detail and ﬁnd that transactions to the United Kingdom are overstated
while transactions to other countries are understated. A typical example of
this is the purchase by U.S. investors of stock from, say, an Italian company
issuing securities in the euro-equity market through banks in London, which
is recorded as a sale of U.K. equity.
Data on the volume of trading are from Datastream’s Global Equity In-
dices and give the aggregation of the number of shares traded multiplied by
the closing price for each stock. Finally, we obtain data on equity holdings
from a joint report issued by the U.S. Treasury, Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2003).
This report is based on TIC data and the 1997 benchmark survey of U.S.
investors.
5.2.2 Matching model and data ﬂows
Flow and volume data record sums over all transactions in a given month
or quarter; the TIC database does not provide guidance on which days, and
hence at what prices, the transactions took place. In contrast, our discrete-
time model makes predictions about holdings at a point in time. To match
model-implied changes in holdings to ﬂow data, we need to normalize the
latter. One convenient way to do this is to divide ﬂows by total market
capitalization at the beginning of the period. To see why this makes sense,
suppose that there are n dates between t and t +1at which transactions
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t is the undetrended local stock price.26
Normalized ﬂows are thus equal to the change in holdings multiplied by
a weighted average of within-month capital gains. In what follows, we match




t−1 ). This match is exact
if all transactions take place on the ﬁr s td a yo ft h em o n t h ;t h a ti s ,t1 = t,
x1 =1 , and xi =0for i>1. Some evidence on the importance of the
resulting bias can be obtained by comparing results with the polar-opposite
case, when ﬂows are normalized by the end-of-period market capitalization
(i.e., tn = t +1and xn =1 ). In terms of our stylized facts, this change
somewhat reduces both the contemporaneous correlation of ﬂows and returns
and the persistence of ﬂows, but the eﬀect is on the order of a few percentage
points for all countries. We conclude that the normalization is reasonable.
It is well known that turnover (that is, the ratio of trading volume to
market capitalization) exhibits an increasing trend. Not surprisingly, the
same is true for gross ﬂows to and from all countries in our model, after they
have been normalized by market capitalization. Our model does not allow
for this type of trend in trading activity: equilibrium holdings, and hence
their diﬀerences, are stationary. However, this need not aﬀect the model’s
relevance for stylized facts about net ﬂows. Indeed, it is plausible that much
of the trend in trading activity is due to features of the trading process that
have been simpliﬁed away in the model, but that are not germane to the
behaviour of net ﬂows.27
Of course, if our model is correct, not all of the gross ﬂows are unrelated
to movements in net ﬂow. In our calibration, we thus insist on obtaining
moments for our model-implied stationary turnover series that approximate
values observed in the data. In particular, we calibrate the expected value of
26Appendix B shows that this normalization is consistent with exponential detrending
of dividend levels.
27First, the actual population of U.S. investors does not consist of long-lived agents that
do not have any idiosyncratic liquidity needs. Trades due to ﬁnite investment horizons
or other liquidity reasons need not aﬀect net ﬂows as long as they average out across
investors. They will, however, be recorded as gross ﬂows and volume. Since their frequency
is arguably increasing with the increase in market participation, this might account for the
trend in the gross measures. A second plausible reason for the trend is rebalancing across
diﬀerent securities. We assume throughout that there is a single (index) security that all
investors hold. In fact, there are many stocks, and agents who hold an index rebalance as
market weights change. Rebalancing does not add to net ﬂows, but it is recorded as gross
ﬂows. It is also likely more frequent because share repurchases and issues have become
more common in recent years.
29turnover to the average turnover over the years 1995—2000. We then compare
other model moments with similar long-run averages from the data.
5.2.3 Summary statistics
Table 3a presents summary statistics for net purchases of stocks abroad by
U.S. investors, as well as excess returns on domestic indexes for the countries
we consider. The mean excess returns in the table are based on detrended
data, which means that the eﬀects of dividend growth are already removed.
This explains why excess returns are smaller than the mean equity premiums
usually reported from raw data, and why Sharpe ratios implied by the table
are unusually low. In our set of countries, changes in American investors’
holdings are small relative to total market capitalization. Within a given
quarter, it is rare to see a change in position of more than 1 per cent of
market capitalization.
Table 3a documents two key stylized facts about the joint distribution of
net inﬂows and excess returns. First, net inﬂows are persistent. The ﬁrst
autocorrelation coeﬃcient ranges between 0.16 for Switzerland and 0.52 for
Canada. In all countries but Italy, it is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 per
cent level. The persistence of net inﬂo w si sn o td u et ot r e n d s .F i g u r e1p l o t s
the net inﬂow series for all countries in our model. It is apparent that the
main feature is slow transitions from periods of high to low net inﬂows.28 For
example, American investors pulled money out of the French stock market
in the late 1970s and reinvested it there again in the mid-1980s. They did
essentially the opposite in the Netherlands: positions that were built slowly
over the late 1970s and early 1980s were unwound between 1983 and 1986.
The second stylized fact is that the contemporaneous correlation between
domestic excess stock returns (measured in U.S. dollars) and net inﬂows
from the United States is strongly positive.
Table 3b reports summary statistics for holdings, gross ﬂows, and volume.
U.S. investors hold signiﬁcant fractions of the market in all of the countries
in our sample, except Italy. Gross purchases and sales are of the same order
of magnitude in all the countries. The stylized fact that gross sales and
28For some countries, such as Germany and Italy, there is a marked change in volatility
between the late 1970s and early 1980s and more recent years. This reﬂects an increase in
overall trading activity. This eﬀect, however, does not induce a trend in the mean of net
inﬂows.
30purchases are highly positively correlated holds both in the time series for
every country and in the cross section of countries. Importantly, the time-
series results reﬂect not only trend behaviour. While there are trends in
gross ﬂo w so v e rt h ew h o l es a m p l e ,b e h a v i o u ro v e ra5 - y e a rp e r i o di sd r i v e n
mostly by volatility that is common to both series. Figure 2 illustrates this
for the countries in our sample. Finally, volume, measured by the value of
all trades divided by market capitalization, varies widely across countries. It
is interesting, however, that holdings of U.S. investors appear to turn over
less frequently than holdings of other investors within the country. This is
true for all but two of the countries in our sample: Canada and the United
Kingdom. This fact will be of interest in our calibration in section 6.
6. Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we ﬁrst describe how we calibrate the model to dividend and
ﬂow data. The procedure outlined in section 6.1 applies to all countries in
our sample. We then provide some further model statistics not used in the
calibration and compare them with the data. We use structural impulse
responses and variance decomposition analysis to interpret our ﬁndings.
6.1 Calibration
6.1.1 Preferences
One period in the model corresponds to 1 quarter. We choose an annual
discount rate of 4 per cent; that is, β =0 .9901.T h ec o e ﬃcient of absolute
risk aversion is set to γ =1 0 .
6.1.2 Investment opportunities
Local dividends and world asset returns are taken directly from the data.
For dividends, we use the detrended process estimated in section 5.1. From
(4), we assume that the world return is unpredictable and uncorrelated with
local dividends. Its mean and standard deviation are matched to the U.S.
stock market return: ¯ RW =0 .0187 and σW =0 .074.
It is diﬃcult to construct an observable counterpart of the returns on
private investment opportunities. Our strategy is to ﬁrst impose a number
31of a priori plausible restrictions that give rise to a two-parameter family of
processes, with the free parameters ηD and ηB introduced in (3). We then
ﬁx the remaining parameters to match selected moments on stock market
trading activity. We impose throughout that the unconditional mean and
variance of private returns are the same as those of the return on the world
asset. In addition, we allow for three speciﬁc features of private returns.
First, private returns can be predictable. Predictability has been docu-
mented in many securities markets and it is certainly prevalent for non-traded
assets, where returns do not need to be competed away quickly. Second, both
the predictable and the unpredictable components of returns may be corre-
lated with the local business cycle. In our model, the latter is captured by
dividends. Third, there may be persistent factors other than the local busi-
ness cycle that aﬀect expected private returns. This feature is of interest
because some opportunities chased by sophisticated investors active in the
local markets may in fact be located in other countries.
According to (3), the ﬁrst component of private expected returns is pro-
portional to the persistent component of local dividends, FD
t . The second
component is driven by a process, FB
t , that is independent of FD
t and also has
an AR(2) structure. We impose that it captures oscillations at business cycle
frequencies by setting the AR(2) parameters equal to those of the persistent
component in U.S. dividends. As a normalization, the variance of shocks to
FB
t is set equal to that of FD
t . The overall volatility of expected returns and
the relative importance of the local business cycle is then governed by the
parameters ηD and ηZ.
In our baseline calibration, we also ﬁx ρ
¡
εB,ε D¢
=0 .5 and σ2
y =0 .1.
Sensitivity analysis has shown that the performance of the model does not
depend strongly on these values. Once they are ﬁxed, and given values for ηD
and ηZ, the variance of unexpected returns, σ2
εB, must be chosen to ensure
that the unconditional variance of private returns matches that of the world
asset return. Our speciﬁcation of investment opportunities thus leaves two
degrees of freedom that can be used to match statistics of trading activity.29
6.1.3 Matching ﬂow moments
In total, we are left to choose ﬁve parameters: the fractions νu, νUS,
and νuUS, that govern the composition of the investor population, and the
29This assumption is not really restrictive, since FB
t is not directly linked to observables.
It could simply be interpreted as sophisticated investors’ perceived expected returns.
32numbers ηD and ηZ that govern the volatility and business cycle correlation
of private returns. We select these parameters to best match ﬁve moments
of trading activity: mean volume, mean local holdings, and mean gross pur-
chases by U.S. investors, as well as the standard deviation and the ﬁrst
autocorrelation of net purchases by U.S. investors. In addition, we use the
positive sign of the contemporaneous correlation of U.S. net purchases and
returns to provide guidance on which investor type is more prevalent in the
U.S. investor population. The relevant model statistics are deﬁned in section
4.4 and their observable counterparts are explained in section 5.2.
Table 4 lists the parameter values of the baseline calibration for all coun-
tries in our model together with data and model values of the target mo-
ments. The target moments are matched tightly, although the model un-
derstates mean volume in Germany, Japan, Italy, and the United Kingdom.
The parameter values for the expected oﬀ-market return process are similar
across countries. The business cycle component is most important in Italy,
the country where the persistent component accounts for less of the dividend
variance (cf. Table 2). In contrast, the independent component, FB
t , plays a
larger role in driving private returns available to investors in the Canadian
stock market. This is needed in order to increase trading volume (see (19)).
For Japan, Italy, and the United Kingdom, the model generates small
volatility of unsophisticated investors’ ﬂows, which brings down the volatility
of trading (see section 4.4). Nonetheless, the model can still match the
volatility of U.S. investors’ ﬂows as long as νuUS is suﬃciently larger than
νu (see (20)). For Germany, the model generates an average trading volume
comparable with other countries, but the data indicate a much larger volume.
In contrast, the model performs well in predicting mean gross purchases in
these markets. The lone exception is the United Kingdom, possibly because
it is a large international ﬁnancial centre (see Levich 1994).
With the exception of Japan and the United Kingdom, the average in-
ternational U.S. investor is sophisticated: νuUS < 0.5.H o w e v e r , f o r a l l
countries, νu <ν uUS, which means that the average U.S. international in-
vestor is less sophisticated than the average local investor. Being relatively
less sophisticated means that the aggregate net ﬂows of U.S. investors are
proportional to unsophisticated investors’ net ﬂows (see (20)). This fact is
consistent with the view that U.S. investors have worse private information
than local investors, usually associated with the existence of a home bias.
Importantly, Table 4 indicates that cross-country heterogeneity observed in
the diﬀerence, νu − νuUS, is not as signiﬁcant as within-country heterogene-
33ity measured by νu − 0.5. Trading is thus not motivated by diﬀerences in
population across countries, but by diﬀerences in investor populations within
countries, as would be expected in G-7 economies.
6.2 Further predictions for ﬂows and returns
O ft h ef o u rs t y l i z e df a c t sw es e to u tt oe x p l a i n ,o n l yt h ep e r s i s t e n c eo fn e t








) is directly used to calibrate the
model. Table 5 reports further data and model statistics not used in the
calibration that are relevant to the other stylized facts. In addition, Figures
3 and 4 present graphs of the entire cross-correlogram of returns and ﬂows
and the autocorrelogram of ﬂo w sf o rt h es i xc o u n t r i e si no u rs a m p l e .
6.2.1 Simultaneous buying and selling
The model produces high positive contemporaneous correlation between
gross purchases and gross sales. Gross trading activity of U.S. investors
thus occurs in bursts of simultaneous buying and selling. The fact that we
overpredict these bursts of trading could be due to transitory idiosyncratic
shocks that are recorded as gross ﬂows. The United Kingdom and Italy are
the only two countries for which the model predicts a negative correlation
between purchases and sales of local stocks by U.S. investors.
6.2.2 Flow continuation and ﬂow reversal
The ﬁrst column in Figures 3 and 4 shows the autocorrelogram of U.S.
investors’ net purchases, (equivalently, that of unsophisticated investors’ net
purchases), with 90 per cent conﬁdence bands computed with Newey-West
e r r o r s . I ti sr e m a r k a b l eh o ww e l lt h em o d e lc a p t u r e st h eJ - c u r v ep a t t e r n
evident in the data. The J-curve pattern displays ﬂow continuation up to 3
( a n ds o m e t i m e s4 )l a g sa n dﬂow reversal at lags 5 and 6. The data also display
a cyclical pattern, with the ﬂow correlations increasing again after lag 6. This
is also captured in the model–as a virtue of the AR(2) processes estimated
for dividends–though at longer horizons. Only the United Kingdom and
Japan display signiﬁcantly more persistence, in the short run, in the data
than in the model.
346.2.3 Return chasing
Return chasing behaviour is apparent both in Table 5 and in the cross-
correlograms in the second column of Figures 3 and 4. The model somewhat
overpredicts the contemporaneous correlation of returns and net purchases
for France, the United Kingdom, and Italy, whereas the performance for
Canada, Germany, and Japan is quite satisfactory. Moreover, the model
captures the tent-shaped curve around the contemporaneous correlation dis-
p l a y e di nt h ed a t a . T h em o d e lm a t c h e sw e l lt h es i g n i ﬁcant return chasing
in France and Germany, and the absence of it in Italy. The model misses
the correlation of lagged returns and current ﬂows for the United Kingdom,
Canada, and Japan. However, it captures the qualitative nature of cyclicality
in the correlation of lagged returns and ﬂows: it is low and negative at 2 and
3 lags, and increases after 4 or 5 lags.
The model also generates positive correlation between net purchases by














This is consistent with evidence presented by Bohn and Tesar (1996) for the
countries in our sample. Bohn and Tesar estimate expected returns using
a comprehensive set of instruments that proxy the public information set.
They then show that U.S. investors move into a market when their ﬁtted
expected returns are high.
6.2.4 Other statistics
The value of E (Vo l t) is calibrated to the data, which means that, in our
model, σ(Vo l t)=0 .7(5) × E (Vo l t). The model predicts that E (Vo l t) >
σ(Vo l t), which is robust across all countries. The exact quantitative per-
formance of the model varies considerably across countries. The model does
well for Germany, but overpredicts the volatility of trading volume by a
factor of 3 for France and Canada. The model signiﬁcantly underpredicts
volatility in trading volume for Italy (see Table 4). With the exception of
Japan, current ﬂows predict one-quarter-ahead returns both in the data and
in the model. For Japan, both the data and the model display a negative
correlation between ﬂows and future returns.
The model exhibits both an equity premium puzzle and a volatility puz-
zle for price levels (not documented), which are two common weaknesses of
35macroeconomic asset-pricing models discussed in detail by Campbell (2000).
These results are not entirely surprising, since, for technical reasons, our
model features constant discount rates. The frictions we introduce thus can-
not produce highly ampliﬁed eﬀects on price levels.
6.3 Interpretation
To provide intuition for our numerical results, we discuss the role of various
structural shocks in generating the stylized facts we are interested in. As a
representative example, we focus on the French stock market.
6.3.1 Impulse responses and variance decomposition
An impulse-response function describes the dynamic response of equilib-
rium prices and trades to a one-time structural shock. We normalize the size
of the shock to one standard deviation. Impulse-response functions are easily
calculated from the model’s stationary vector autoregressive representation.30
Figures 5-7 plot the model’s response to an innovation to the persistent com-
ponent of local dividends (the “business cycle shock,” εFD
t ) ,t oat r a n s i t o r y
shock to dividends, εD
t , and to an innovation to the oﬀ-market factor, εFB
t ,
respectively. Each row corresponds to a variable or group of variables: from
top to bottom, we have the local stock price, Pt, the forecast errors on the
business cycle by both investor types, FD
t − ˆ FDs
t and FD
t − ˆ FDu
t (plotted to-
gether in the second row), the local per-dollar stock return, unsophisticated
investors’ net purchases, and conditional one-quarter-ahead forecasts of the
local stock return.
Not all of the structural shocks discussed above are equally important
for a given model statistic. To quantify the role of the diﬀerent shocks, we
provide variance decompositions of key second moments. Figure 8 plots the
contribution of every shock to the covariance of unsophisticated investors’
ﬂows and returns, the covariance of unsophisticated investors’ current and
lagged ﬂows, the covariance of unsophisticated investors’ ﬂows and their ex-










¢0.I tc a nb ev e r i ﬁed that the vector xt has a ﬁrst-
order vector autoregressive representation where the errors are the economy’s structural
shocks, and that this characterization of xt fully describes the equilibrium of the model.
Any variable in the economy, such as asset holdings and ﬂows or realized and expected
returns, can be easily constructed from xt.
36lagged stock returns.31
6.3.2 Return chasing and the business cycle
Persistent local business cycle shocks induce return chasing. The vari-
ance decompositions show that εFD
t accounts for most of the correlation of
ﬂows with both current and past returns. While temporary dividend shocks
contribute to the contemporaneous correlation, they actually have a small
negative eﬀect on the lagged correlation. Shocks to the oﬀ-market factor are
largely irrelevant for return chasing.
The impulse response to a positive innovation, εFD
t , i ss h o w ni nt h eﬁrst
column of Figure 5. On impact, prices increase in response to higher current
dividends and future expected payouts. Unsophisticated investors observe
these public signals. They underreact to the shock, since they cannot be
sure that FD
t has actually moved. Sophisticated investors underreact by
less, because they have more signals to rely on. Disagreement trading by
itself would thus lead the more optimistic sophisticated investors to buy
shares. Improved private opportunities also trigger risk-sharing trades. Both
the myopic and the hedging demands of sophisticated investors decrease as
they try to get rid of tradable business cycle risk. Overall, the risk-sharing
eﬀect dominates: sophisticated investors sell the domestic stock market as
prices rise, which contributes to positive contemporaneous correlation of net
purchases and returns.
The high stock return that occurs on impact is followed by further net
purchases by unsophisticated investors, before reversal sets in. In fact, for
about three quarters after the impact eﬀect, disagreement and risk-sharing
trades move in the same direction, generating pronounced return chasing.
On the one hand, disagreement is reduced as unsophisticated investors learn
the nature of the shock. This encourages them to buy. On the other hand,
business cycle momentum creates more private opportunities. Sophisticated
investors’ incentive to sell shares thus also increases, at least in the short run.
After about 3 quarters, reversal sets in. The disagreement eﬀect weakens as
unsophisticated investors have learned the nature of the shock. At the same
time, the return on private opportunities begins to revert to the mean. As a
result, sophisticated investors return to the stock market. Importantly, both
return chasing and the eventual reversal are predictable consequences of the
31We omit the shocks to sophisticated investors’ private signals and to transitory oﬀ-
market returns, because they have a minimal direct contribution to these moments.
37initial shock (and concomitant high return). This eﬀect thus explains the
observed oscillations in the cross-correlogram.
Transitory shocks to dividends contribute only to a contemporaneous cor-
relation of ﬂows and returns. In response to such a shock (shown in Figure 6),
both types of investors see dividends increase and assign positive probability
to the shock being persistent. Unsophisticated investors, however, become
more optimistic than sophisticated investors, because they have fewer sig-
nals about the persistent component, FD
t . They expect a continuation of
high prices and future positive returns, and buy the local stock market. In
contrast, sophisticated investors are less optimistic and sell the local stock
market. The impact of the shock induces a positive correlation between un-
sophisticated investor ﬂows and returns. After the impact, trades driven
by a transitory shock are quickly reversed as investors correct their forecast
errors. Too large a contribution from these shocks would thus prevent the
model from matching the positive correlation of net purchases with lagged
returns.
6.3.3 Flow momentum, reversal, and risk-sharing
The autocorrelation of ﬂo w si sm a i n l yd r i v e nb yb o t hb u s i n e s sc y c l e
shocks and shocks to the oﬀ-market factor. For both types of shock, the
major motive of trade is risk-sharing: as oﬀ-market opportunities improve,
sophisticated investors try to shed tradable business cycle risk to load up on
non-tradable risk. The impulse response of ﬂo w st ot h et w os h o c k si st h u s
similar in shape.
Initially, there is a fair amount of disagreement: unsophisticated investors
underestimate the actual state of the business cycle. Whereas this is due to
underreaction after an FD
t shock (Figure 7), it is due to overreaction after an
FB
t shock (see Figure 5). In the latter case, unsophisticated investors see only
a drop in prices, which they will partly attribute to a downturn in the local
business cycle and partly to the FB
t shock. Since prices must fall on impact
to entice unsophisticated investors to buy, the FB
t contributes negatively to
the contemporaneous correlation of ﬂows and returns.
Disagreement makes it costly for sophisticated investors to sell early on.
As the shock persists, investors learn the nature of the shock and the fore-
cast error is reduced. Sophisticated investors keep leaving the stock market,
generating persistent ﬂows. Importantly, only persistent shocks are able to
generate persistence in ﬂows and returns. Transitory shocks to dividends
38produce very quick reversals of ﬂows that translate into negatively serially
correlated ﬂows. This constrains the model’s ability to generate the observed
trading patterns: calibrations that create a bigger role for transitory shocks








worsen the model’s performance in terms of ﬂow persistence.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Dividends 
 
    
  µ  σ  ρ1 
Canada 4.89 0.34  0.93 
France 2.19 0.47 0.96 
Germany 5.50  1.41  0.97 
Italy 0.57  0.27  0.98 
Japan 14.81 2.87  0.98 
U.K. 12.91 2.23  0.92 
U.S. 91.51 3.61 0.90 
    
 
Note: Mean (µ), standard deviation (σ), and first autocorrelations 
(ρ1) of detrended, seasonally adjusted dividends, deflated by U.S. 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3a: Excess Returns and Net Flows 
 
            
            
  Excess returns (%)   Net inflows (%)   
           
  µ(R
D) σ(R
D)  µ(NF*) σ(NF*) ρ1(NF*) ρ(R
D, NF*) 
Canada 1.4  8.1  0.17  0.37  0.52  0.27 
France 1.5 11.7  0.15  0.28  0.46  0.17 
Germany 0.7  9.8  0.03 0.14  0.35  0.28 
Italy 0.9  15.0  0.05  0.31  0.16  0.13 
Japan 0.8  13.0  0.05  0.13  0.45  0.40 
U.K. 0.8  9.3  0.12  0.24  0.51  0.16 
U.S.   1.9  7.4  -  -  -  - 
           
 
Notes: Means (µ), standard deviations (σ), and first autocorrelations (ρ1) for 
excess returns (log quarterly US$ returns minus 3-month T-bill rate) and net 
inflows (net purchases of foreign stocks by U.S. investors, normalized by 
beginning-of-period market capitalization). ρ(R
D, NF*) is the 
contemporaneous correlation coefficient of excess returns and net inflows. 
Quarterly data, 1977Q2–2000Q3.  
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Table 3b: Holdings, Turnover, and Gross Flows 
 



























Canada  14.3 14.1 2.7  3.2 3.0  0.97 
France  12.7 16.0 3.4  0.9 0.9  0.62 
Germany 9.9  51.6  13.2  1.0 1.0  0.87 
Italy 1.1  86.2  35.1  0.8  0.8  0.60 
Japan  39.0  4.8 2.7  0.9 0.8  0.91 
U.K.  12.4  3.9 2.1  4.5 4.5  0.95 
U.S.    14.3 14.1 2.7  3.2 3.0  0.97 
         
Note: U.S. holdings are a fraction of local market capitalization, as of 31 
December 1999. Volume is total value of shares traded divided by market 
capitalization. Gross purchases (GP) and gross sales (GS) are divided by 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: Non-Calibrated Moments 
 
        
 France  Canada  Germany 
  Data Model  Data Model  Data Model 
Corr(NFt
US, Rt





(*)  +  0.15  + 0.17  + 0.20 
σ(Volt)  in  %  3.1 12.6  2.7  10.7 13.2  9.3 
Corr(GPt
US, GSt
US)  0.63  0.98 0.97 0.97  0.87 0.99 
         
         
         
 U.K.  Japan  Italy 
  Data Model  Data Model  Data Model 
Corr(NFt
US, Rt





(*) +  0.21  +  0.26  +  0.20 
σ(Volt)  in  %  2.1 0.7 2.7 0.8  35.1  0.8 
Corr(GPt
US, GSt
US)  0.95  -0.17 0.91 0.89 0.60 -0.44 
        
 
Note: Data for Corr(NFt
US, Rt
D) are taken from Table 2 in Bohn and 




Figure 1: Net Purchases by U.S. Investors as a Fraction of Local Market Capitalization 
 





Figure 2: U.S. Investors Gross Purchases and Sales of Foreign Equities as a Fraction of 
Local Market Capitalization  
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Figure 3: Autocorrelogram of Flows and Cross-Correlogram of Returns and Flows: 
France, Canada, and Germany. Notes:  q D
US D
t
,  is net purchases of the local asset by U.S. 
investors;  R
D









Figure 4: Autocorrelogram of Flows and Cross-Correlogram of Returns and Flows: U.K., 




 is net purchases of the local asset by U.S. investors;  R
D
t  
is the current return on the local asset. 
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Figure 5: Impulse-Response Functions of the Asymmetric Information Model to a 
Persistent Business Cycle Shock. Notes: 
U
t q D is net purchases of the local asset by 
unsophisticated investors;  R
D





 is the 
time  t expectation by investors of type  i of the time  t+1 return on the local 
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Figure 6: Impulse-Response Functions of the Asymmetric Information Model to a 
Transient Business Cycle Shock. Notes: 
U
t q D is net purchases of the local asset by 
unsophisticated investors;  R
D





 is the 
time  t expectation by investors of type  i of the time  t+1 return on the local 






t -  is the forecast error by investors of type i on the local business cycle 
factor. 
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Figure 7: Impulse-Response Functions of the Asymmetric Information Model. Note: 
u D
t q D is the local business cycle factor. 
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Figure 8: Variance Decomposition in the Asymmetric Information Model. Notes: 
u D
t q D is 
net purchases of the local asset by unsophisticated investors;  R
D
t
 is the return on the 




t 1 + ) is the time t expectation by unsophisticated investors of the time  
t+1 return on the local asset.  
 
 Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 1
In this appendix, we provide the complete proof of Theorem 1 in the main
text. In the equilibrium that we analyze, the local equity asset price depends
on factor realizations and beliefs of unsophisticated investors in these factors:










t, deﬁned in the text, gives the vector of unsophisticated in-
vestors’ observable variables; i.e., the local dividend and price and the world
return. Unsophisticated investors do not see the return on sophisticated in-
vestors’ private opportunities. Applying the Kalman ﬁlter to this problem
for unsophisticated investors yields:

























Using this information, we can now construct the unsophisticated in-
vestors’ state vector, φ
u
t = ˆ Fu











Repeating the same process for sophisticated investors’ conditional forecasts,
ˆ Fs


















Consider the decision problem of both investors. Write returns as
R
i




































































−κ − ˜ γ
¡
Rf (wt − ct)+θ
0










































= ¯ θ + Θφt,



















The ﬁrst term (i.e., ˜ γ−1 ¡
Mθθ¢−1 MRφ)i nm a t r i xΘ gives the myopic demand
of the investor, whereas the second term (i.e., -˜ γ−1 ¡
Mθθ¢−1 MRεφΩMφe0UΦ)
gives the hedging demand of the investor.







, we see that risk-averse investors care
not only about ﬂuctuations in wealth, but also about changes in beliefs,
captured by the state vector, φ
i
t.T h e q u a d r a t i c t e r m r e ﬂects investors’
taste for “unusual” investment opportunities. Intuition for this eﬀect can be
obtained by considering the case of one state variable. Ui is then a positive
number and continuation utility is higher the further φ
i
t is from its mean of
zero. Since φ
i
t is payoﬀ-relevant, it drives expected returns at some time in
the future. An unusual value signals that above-average expected returns
will be available, by either going long or short.
59The foregoing enables us to describe in detail the coeﬃcients of the opti-
mal portfolio policy, θ
i































































where the matrix ˜ ΣRiRi is a transformation of the conditional covariance
matrix of returns.32 We use this decomposition in the main text.
Solving for the optimal consumption level and the value function, we see
that, for a given price function, optimality requires the following constraints
to be met: ˜ γ = γ
Rf−1
































































Finally, to solve for an equilibrium, let ΘDs
ˆ Fs be the part of the ﬁrst row
of Θs that is associated with ˆ Fs
t, and let ΘDu be the ﬁrst row of Θu.I n
equilibrium, we require that
∆¯ θ
Du +( 1− ∆)¯ θ
Ds =1
∆Θ
Du +( 1− ∆)Θ
Ds
ˆ F = 0.


















In the data, dividends and ﬂows exhibit trends, whereas our quantitative
exercise explores a detrended economy. In this appendix, we outline a con-
sistent approach to detrending dividends and ﬂows. To ﬁx ideas, consider
the following stylized view of the stock market. There are ¯ S ﬁrms, each with
a single share, paying the same (per-share) dividend, D∗
t, and having the
same (per-share) price, P∗
t . Dividends grow at an exponential rate, η.T h e
parameter η thus captures trend ﬁrm productivity growth, which beneﬁts
owners through dividends.
An observed aggregate price index records the change in the value of the
average ﬁrm, P∗
t /P ∗
t−1. This change in valuation has two components: capital
gains that arise from ﬂuctuations in the ﬁrm’s stationary price, Pt/Pt−1, and









Observed dividend yield, δt, is simply the ratio D∗
t/P ∗
t = Dt/Pt.An a t -
ural way to remove the trend from dividends is to exponentially detrend
the measure δtP∗
t . Observed holdings of the domestic equity index by in-
vestor i are P∗
t θ
Di∗
t . Observed market capitalization at the end of period t
is the combined value of all plants, M∗
t = P∗
t ¯ S. Normalizing holdings by
beginning-of-period market capitalization is thus a natural way to remove











There is an explicit connection between dividends and equilibrium hold-
ings before and after detrending. We can summarize an economy driven by











































33We suppress the indexes for the diﬀerent types of agent. Naturally, holdings of the
same asset by diﬀerent types of agent are detrended in the same way.



















In our quantitative exercise, we consider a detrended economy. We de-
termine a stationary dividend process, Dt, as the residual in a regression of
average ﬁrm dividends on a time trend,
log(δtP
∗
t )=E [logDt]+ηt+( l o gDt − E [logDt]). (B1)
We then match the equilibrium ﬂows to observed ﬂows normalized by mar-
ket capitalization. In the light of the above result, this ensures consistent
detrending of dividends and ﬂows.
We also need to select an interest rate, Rf, and a return process, RW
t ,
for the detrended economy. We use the observed average interest rate and
U.S. stock return. In terms of the above notation, we are thus analyzing the
economy E0. Given our data, this is preferable to considering the economy
Eˆ η,w h e r eˆ η is the growth-rate estimate from (B1): in a small sample such
as ours, ˆ η is driven by medium-term developments and does not reﬂect the
long-run average growth rate. In particular, in our sample, ˆ η exceeds the
average real riskless interest rate. We are thus not likely to learn much by
considering equilibrium ﬂows from Eˆ η. At the same time, the result of the
previous paragraph shows that the only role of the trend growth rate, η, is
to shift all returns, which suggests that the behaviour of the correlations we
are interested in will be similar across all economies Eη where η is reasonably
small.
62Appendix C: The Dividend Process
In this appendix, we describe how we estimate the dividend process. We
derive conditions under which a general ARMA(2,2) process permits a rep-

















t are serially uncorrelated and independent random vari-












εD.T o p r o v e
our result, we need to compare the correlogram of dividends under the two
representations. Consider ﬁrst the representation, (C1). The correlogram of
the persistent component, FD



































































































; s ≥ 3.
The correlogram of the dividend process is thus given by
Va r
¡































































as well as, for every s ≥ 3,
Cov
¡
















Dt − ¯ D,Dt−s+2 − ¯ D
¢
.
63Next, consider a general ARMA(2,2) process
Dt − ¯ D = a1
¡




Dt−2 − ¯ D
¢
+ ut + λ1ut−1 + λ2ut−2,
where ut is serially uncorrelated with mean zero and variance σ2
u.S q u a r i n g
both sides and taking expectations, we have
Va r
¡






































Dt − ¯ D,Dt−1 − ¯ D
¢
.
Multiplying both sides by
¡
Dt−1 − ¯ D
¢
and taking expectations, we have
Cov
¡










Dt−2 − ¯ D
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Dt−2 − ¯ D
¢
and taking expectations, we obtain
Cov
¡














The variance can be solved in terms of parameters only:
Va r
¡





















2 +2 a1λ1 +2 a2






The ﬁrst and second covariances are then given by (C2) and (C3) and all
further covariances (for s ≥ 3) follow the recursion
Cov
¡








Dt − ¯ D,Dt−s+2 − ¯ D
¢
.
64It is clear that, if a given ARMA(2,2) process is to have the representa-
tion (C1), the autoregressive coeﬃcients must be the same in both represen-
tations. Moreover, since the recursions for all covariances beyond lag 2 are
identical, a representation of the type (C1) exists if there exist σ2
εFD,σ 2
εD > 0










2 +2 a1λ1 +2 a2
1λ2






























The ﬁrst and last equations can be used to calculate the implied values
of σ2
εD and σ2




















2 +2 a1λ1 +2 a
2
















The second equation implies the additional constraint
0=a2λ1 (1 + λ2) − a1λ2 (1 − a2). (C5)
In a ﬁrst estimation step, we impose (C5), but do not impose the inequality
constraint. The inequalities are not binding in all countries except for Japan
and the United Kingdom. For these countries, we impose σ2
εD =0 .001,
and re-estimate the restricted ARMA(2,2) process. Setting the variance of
transient shocks to dividends equal toz e r oi m p l i e st h a tt h e r ea r en ot r a d e s
based on private information because the equilibrium is fully revealing.
Table C1 reports the estimates for the restricted ARMA(2,2) process.
These estimates are then used to produce Table 2 in the main text according
to the formulas in (C4). The estimated ARMA(2,2) produces statistically
65signiﬁcant estimates of the autoregressive parameters a1 and a2 for most of
the countries (except for Japan’s a2), and statistically signiﬁcant estimates
of the moving-average parameters λ1 and λ2 as well (except for France and
Japan). Estimates of σ2
u are also signiﬁcant in all cases except for Canada.
The constraint (C5) is not rejected in four out of nine countries at the usual
5 per cent signiﬁcance level.
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Table C1: Estimates of ARMA(2,2) Process 
 
           
 a 1 a 2  λ1  λ2  σu²  χ
2 
p-value 
Canada  1.859  -0.896  -1.051  0.365 0.013 4.499 
  6.59  -3.94  -4.23  2.91 0.78 0.033 
          
France  1.369  -0.420  -0.092  0.020 0.014 5.327 
  33.39 -20.60  -0.64  0.62 5.42 0.020 
          
Germany  1.734  -0.773  -0.803  0.253 0.101 2.608 
  19.47  -8.99  -4.92  3.80 6.18 0.106 
          
Italy 1.685  -0.708  -0.398  0.108  0.001  30.41 
  51.41 -32.03  -4.94  4.47 8.28 0.000 
          
Japan 1.212  -0.275  -0.002  0.0004  0.786  2.768 
  4.884  -0.295  -0.815  0.272 3.141 0.096 
          
U.K. 1.223  -0.294  -0.003  0.0005  0.575  2.089 
  16.408  -5.464  -9.349  6.125 8.212 0.148 
          
U.S.  1.679  -0.747  -0.754  0.237 2.100 3.846 
  6.60  -3.18  -2.02  1.55 9.48 0.049 
           
Note: For each country, the second row gives t-statistics for the 
corresponding estimates. χ
2(1) and p-values are given for the non-linear 
constraint (C5). 
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